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Class Action Law in Georgia:
Emerging Trends in Litigation,
Certification, and Settlement
by Jeffrey G. Casurella*
and
John R. Bevis**
The lawyers have twisted it into such a state of bedevilment that the
original merits of the case have long disappeared from the face of the
earth ....
It's about nothing but Costs now.
Charles Dickens
BLEAK HOUSE
In the litigation world, few words trigger more attention and more
debate than the term "class action." At the term's first appearance, the
playing field is set. Plaintiffs urge that class actions are a necessary
vehicle to litigate paltry and duplicitous claims otherwise inconvenient
or uneconomical to prosecute. In response, defendants argue class
actions constitute an abuse complicated by individuality and unmanageability. Rarely do the parties agree to the utility of class actions.
Notwithstanding this classic disagreement, this type of litigation serves
a useful purpose, filling a vacuum left otherwise empty when legislatures fail to legislate and attorneys general fail to prosecute matters that
adversely affect certain segments of our society.

* Partner in the firm of Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella. Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1984). University of Georgia (A.B., 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia. Mr. Casurella concentrates a large portion of his practice in class
action litigation in Georgia and throughout the United States.
** Associate in the firm of Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella. Florida State
University College of Law (J.D., 1995). Florida State University (B.S., 1990). Member,

State Bar of Georgia and Georgia Trial Lawyers Association. Mr. Bevis concentrates a
large portion of his practice in the practical application of class action litigation issues.
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Georgia's class action statute ("Georgia Rule 23"),1 is loosely modeled
on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23"). Because
there are so few definitive Georgia decisions interpreting Georgia Rule
23, Georgia courts historically rely upon federal decisional law for
guidance.2 By virtue of this and through judicial fiat, the Georgia
Supreme Court authorizes class actions in addition to the provisions of
Georgia Rule 23 when there are common questions of law or fact
involved and a common relief is sought.3 Still, there exists significant
procedural differences between the state statute and its federal
counterpart. How then will recent developments in federal class action
jurisprudence play out in class actions brought in the Georgia courts?
Regardless of the advocacy, it is well established that the discretion
of the trial judge in certifying or refusing to certify a class action is
respected in all cases in which discretion is not abused.4 Like all
jurisdictions, Georgia courts bear out the definitive ruling that class
certification is strictly a procedural matter; the decision is not based on
whether the complaint states a cause of action or whether the plaintiffs
may ultimately prevail on the merits. The proper focus is whether
numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation are
satisfied.5
I.

ESTABLISHING THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF CLASS CERTIFICATION

Because the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the requisite
elements for class certification," ethical and practical prefiling considerations mandate plaintiff's counsel to determine whether the circumstanc-

1. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 (1993 & Supp. 1997), Georgia's statutory class action mechanism,
provides the following:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly ensure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, bring
or defend an action when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is: (1) Joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; or (2) Several, and the object of the action
is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in
the action.
2. Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 953, 216 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1975).
3. Georgia Inv. Co. v. Norman, 229 Ga. 160, 162, 190 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1972).
4. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926
(1984); Hill v. General Fin. Corp., 144 Ga. App. 434, 436, 241 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1977).
5. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a); e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974);
Sta-PowerIndus., 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897.
6. Sheftelman v. Jones, 667 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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es of the case warrant class status and whether the client will serve as
an adequate representative. The litigation revolves around these two
considerations, for unlike a case on the merits, the failure to satisfy any
one of the four requisites sounds a swift death knell to class certification
and thus to the merits of the uniform practices being challenged.
A. - Numerosity
There exists no bright-line test for determining numerosity. Although
mere allegations are insufficient, plaintiffs are not required to establish
the exact number of persons they seek to represent.7 A good-faith
numerosity estimate of the number of individuals involved is sufficient.'
The final determination rests on the court's practical judgment in light
of the particular facts of each case. 9 With conditional certification
comes a flexibility that "enhances the usefulness of the class action
device" to ensure that "actual, not presumed, conformity with Rule 23(a)"
exists. 10 When the numerosity question is a close one, a balance is
struck in favor of finding numerosity because the court has the option
to decertify the class if the evidence does not yield sufficient numbers to
satisfy numerosity." Notwithstanding these ethereal considerations,
one reported decision in Georgia has upheld a finding of numerosity with
as few as twenty-five class members. 2
Commonality and Typicality
The utility of a class action allows people of modest means a convenient way to recoup damages while, at the same time, prevents a
multiplicity of suits based on a single wrong suffered by many but

B.

7. Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340,348 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (citing Evans v. U.S.
Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925,930 (11th Cir. 1983)); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. London,
175 Ga. App. 33, 36, 332 S.E.2d 345, 347 (1985); Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D.
108, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1972); 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA COMTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS

ACTIONS § 3.05, at 3-18 (3d ed. 1992).
8. Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 348; 1 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, § 3.05, at 3-21 to
3-22 (citing Ventura v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 125 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)). Class actions have been approved by courts involving as few as twenty-five and
forty class members. Sta.Power Indus., 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897.
9. 168 F.R.D. at 348.
10. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); Evans, 696 F.2d at 930.
11. 696 F.2d at 930; Foster v. Bechtel Power Corp., 89 F.R.D. 624 (E.D. Ark. 1981);
accord, Tolbert, 56 F.R.D. at 113 (stating "the wise practice is to allow such cases to
proceed, at least at the onset, as class actions").
12. Sta.Power Indus., 134 Ga. App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897.
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common to all.13 For these reasons commonality and typicality tend to
merge. 4 Commonality relates to the mode of the challenged practice,
and typicality relates to the similarity of the claims among the
members." There must be a nexus between the class representative's
claims or defenses and the common questions of fact or law that unite
the class.'" Where there is not, commonality and typicality do not
exist, and the case cannot proceed as a class action. Particular factual
differences, differences in the amount of damages claimed, or even the
availability of certain defenses against a class representative do not
necessarily render a named plaintiff's claims atypical. 7 Essentially,
the class representative's claim is typical of the class claims if all arise
from the "same event" or "pattern or practice" and are based on the same
legal theory-as long as the plaintiffs and the class have an interest in
prevailing on similar legal claims.'"
C. Adequacy of Representation
The individual ability of a plaintiff to represent a class of similarly
injured persons is a paramount consideration. Two important aspects
of the adequate representation requirement are (1) whether the
plaintiffs counsel is experienced and competent and (2) whether the
named plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to those of the class.'" TO
this end, courts permit inquiries into the personal characteristics and
integrity of the proposed plaintiff and class counsel.2'
1. Competency of Counsel. In determining whether a plaintiff's
counsel is competent, courts generally look to whether counsel is
qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed
litigation.2 ' "The adequacy requirement mandates an inquiry into the
zeal and competence of the representative's counsel and into the
willingness and ability of the representative to take an active role in and

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1985)).

Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968).
General Tel. Co., 457 U.S. 147.
General Tel. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980).
Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984).
Meyer v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 106 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D. Ga. 1985).
Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 350.
See, e.g., Schatzman v. Talley, 91 F.R.D. 270, 273 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Id.
Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 351 (citing Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1533 (11th Cir.
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control the litigation and to protect the interest of absentees."2 2 Most
defendants, however, do not belabor the question of whether a plaintiff's
chosen counsel will adequately represent the interests of the, class and
seldom insist that plaintiff's counsel provide evidence setting forth
qualifications and experience for the court to evaluate the ability of the
lawyers to prosecute the action. There is no concurrent requirement to
test the competence and experience of the defense counsel. Rather, the
focus in the adequacy of representation requirement turns to the
abilities and understandings of the persons proposed as the class
representatives.
2. Ability of the Named Plaintiff to Represent the Class. The
primary criterion for determining whether a named plaintiff will fairly
and adequately represent the class is the forthrightness and vigor with
which the representative party is expected to assert and defend the
interests of the members of the class.' The challenges most frequently
made in this regard are to the named representative's understanding of
the case and his or her ability to singly fund the litigation.
a. A Named Plaintiff's Understanding of the Case. To avoid the
vesting of unbridled discretion and anointing of the class attorney as the
true class representative, courts will consider the knowledge and
willingness of the named plaintiff to measure that person's ability to
adequately represent the class.24 Ironically, the very lack of sophistication and financial wherewithal that makes individuals vulnerable prey
to sophisticated corporate practices often serves as the leading argument
of why the class representative is inadequate.2 5 Courts harmonize this
dichotomy by requiring a generalized, as opposed to a specific and
detailed, understanding of the case. Indeed, a plaintiff's lack of detailed
knowledge of all the facts and issues in the case has never been deemed
to be proof of bad faith, frivolous proceedings, or maintenance by class
counsel because reliance may rightfully be placed upon the attorney's

22. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 484 (5th Cir. 1982).
23. Schatzman, 91 F.R.D. at 273.
24. Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 353.
25. Consider the following statement:
An all-too-common defense ploy is to try to belittle the class representative by
attempting to show through cross-examination that the plaintiffs do not have
broad knowledge of the practices of the defendant and have what the defense
argues is an inadequate understanding of the legal complexities of class action
practice.
KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLANTFFS IN TITLE VII ACmONS § 23.21, at 287 (1994).
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advice and investigation.2" Thus, many courts hold that the knowledge
of a class representative is of minimal importance in highly complex
matters." All that is required is that class representatives have a
working knowledge of the case and understand their respective roles as
class representatives. 8
b. FinancialAbility of the Class Representatiue to Singly Fund the
Litigation. Notwithstanding the general knowledge requirement, the
mandate that a named plaintiff "fairly ensure the adequate representation of all" typically gives rise to an inquiry by a defendant whether the
class representative has the financial ability to fund the case.' This
is perhaps one of the most fertile areas for a defendant to explore in
crafting a response to a motion for class certification. In no other
litigation arena is it possible to challenge standing based solely upon the
plaintiff's financial status. Despite this, it is routine for a defendant to
advance the argument that a named plaintiff who is not able to singly
fund the litigation cannot fairly and adequately represent the class.8 °
Though such an argument is frequently made, it has never been
accepted as a sole basis to deny class certification.
Generally, courts eschew the question of whether litigants are rich or
poor.3 1 "[I1f financial capacity is emphasized, it may mean that poorer
claimants will be prevented from maintaining class actions. Accordingly,
discretion is required; although the ability to fund the case is a factor,
it probably should not be a determinative factor."32 Courts, therefore,
normally will not permit an in-depth examination of the finances of the
class representative," and although questions concerning the financial
ability of the named plaintiff to fund the litigation is typically sought out

26. Shipee v. Trinity Indus., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 119 (E.D. Tex. 1983)
(citing Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 845 (1966)).
27. See Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 353 (1974), and the cases cited therein.
28. Id.
29. Risen, 417 U.S. 156. Historically, courts are charged to ensure that access to the
courts is not determinable on the basis of wealth or lack of wealth. However, because class
representatives are ultimately responsible for the costs incurred in the litigation, including
the high cost of adequate notice to the class members, exploration of a class representative's financial status is often sought out by the defense as a means of demonstrating that
the proposed representative cannot adequately represent the class.
30. When the defendant is successful, class certification efforts fail because the plaintiff
has not satisfied the burden of establishing all the requisite elements for class certification.
31. Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1974).
32. Schatzman, 91 F.R.D. at 273 n.2 (citing Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106,
1112 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978); ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 32 (Federal Judicial Center 1977)).
33. Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 352 (citing Sanderson, 507 F.2d at 479-80).
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in discovery, it has been held that a class representative's personal
finances are not particularly important.34 Financial ability alone is
never the determinative factor in class certification, 5 and proper
deposition preparation can limit the permissible scope of the defendant's
exploration into the financial assets of the plaintiff.
In a well-reasoned and well-researched opinion, a New York appellate
court summarized the law: "We share the concern of other courts and
legal writers on the subject that such financial inquiry should not be
allowed to degenerate into an oppressive means of discouraging the
action, as well as a tactical defense to the class action prior to reaching
the substantive issues." 36 Noting that attorneys may ethically advance
the costs of litigation, the court held that a class action defendant may
legitimately inquire about a plaintiff's understanding of his ultimate
liability to pay the expenses of the litigation.8 7 The court stated:
If the ... plaintiff believes he or she is free from ultimate liability,
then the assets of [the] plaintiff might conceivably become relevant as
evidence that the attorney is maintaining the suit.... However, since
advancement [of litigation costs] by counsel with expectation of
reimbursement later is a predictable element of many actions,
including class actions, where a class plaintiff and the attorney for the
class agree that the latter will advance all costs of litigation... and
the plaintiff will reimburse counsel for all expenses should plaintiff
lose, questions concerning plaintiff's financial status become irrelevant
on the issue of class certification.'
Experience dictates that defense inquiries concerning a class
representative's financial ability may be potentially abusive as an
attempt to intimidate the class representative and to obtain detailed
information about the financial arrangements between the plaintiff and
counsel. Though "[pirecertification inquiries into the financial arrangements between the class representatives and their counsel respecting the
expenses of litigation are rarely appropriate,"3 the obvious interest a
defendant has in discovering the information is to support a suspicion
(and reason to oppose class certification) that the lawyer, and not the

34. Mack v. G.M.A.C., 169 F.R.D. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1996).

35. McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. Stern v. Carter, 441 N.Y.S.2d 717, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
37. Id. at 725.
38. Id. at 730-31.
39. MANuAL FOR COMPLEx LmGATION § 30.12, at 216 (3d ed. 1995).
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Class actions are designed to
plaintiff, is maintaining the case.'
provide a forum for people of all income levels and to enhance the
efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited
resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture." Thus, when
plaintiff's counsel is financially able and willing to advance all necessary
costs, including the cost of notice, and the class representative understands his obligation to repay those expenses regardless of the outcome,
courts and defendants at the certification stage have no ripened interest
whether a representative plaintiff can reimburse the attorney for costs
and expenses if an adverse judgment is'entered. 42 Thus, as tempting
as it may be for a defendant to inquire into a named representative's
financial standing, there is no legitimate basis, in the final analysis, to
deny class certification due to a class representative's financial ability.
c. Standing Issues Concerning a Bankrupt Class Representative. Occasionally, issues concerning a pending or previous bankruptcy
of a class representative may become an issue. Defense counsel should
be alerted to the proposition that in most cases bankrupt class representatives are technically prohibited from serving as adequate representatives of the class. Besides the underpinnings of their postbankuptcy
ability to fund the case, standing may become an issue if the potential
class claim was not identified in a bankruptcy arising before the class
action was filed. The potential problem arises because the trustee of the
bankrupt estate, not the class member, is the person who owns the claim
and, accordingly, is the only one who has the right to pursue an action
on the claim.'
In United Technologies Corp. v. Gaines," the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that "title" to a cause of action passes to the trustee. 45
Absent a refusal by the trustee to assign or abandon the claim, the
trustee acquires the sole right to prosecute the action. 4'6 When a
trustee holds title to a claim, "the debtor may not bring suit on that

40.

This requirement is necessary to ensure that lawyers will not solicit plaintiffs to

fictitiously stand in the class representative's shoes with no realistic expectation of the
consequences of bringing a frivolous class action suit.
41. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972).
42.

Stern, 441 NY.S.2d at 727 (citing Sanderson, 507 F.2d at 479-80).

The class

certification death-knell does not toll merely because the plaintiffs are not wealthy.
43. United Techs. Corp. v. Gaines, 225 Ga. App. 191, 192, 483 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1997).
44.

225 Ga. App. 191, 483 S.E.2d 357 (1997).

45. Id. at 191, 483 S.E.2d at 359.
46. Id. at 192, 483 S.E.2d at 359.
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action unless the property has been abandoned by the trustee. ' 7
Justice Cardozo formulated the following rule in Barletta v. Tedeschi:4
When the trustee abandons estate property, the property stands as if
no bankruptcy had been filed and the debtor enjoys the same claim to
it as he held previous to filing of the bankruptcy .... [T]itle reverts
to the bankrupt, nunc pro tunc, so that he is treated as having owned
it continuously.49
The court in Barletta rejected the argument that Tedeschi did not have
standing to sue because his claim was not abandoned until after suit
was filed. The court ruled that the subsequent abandonment by the
trustee stood as if no bankruptcy was filed.' Likewise, if class counsel
proposes a bankrupt plaintiff as an adequate representative of the class
claim, special care must be taken before the certification process to
ensure that the bankruptcy trustee has properly abandoned the claim so
that the class representative's standing does not become an insurmountable impedance to class certification.
II.

PRACTICAL ISSUES GOVERNING CLASS CERTIFICATION

Aside from the standard opposition to class certification on the basis
of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, defendants
should, and usually do, advance whatever arguments are necessary to
thwart the plaintiff's ability to maintain the case as a class action.
When a case is certified as a class action, the odds in favor of the
plaintiff prevailing on his claims in court or in obtaining a successful
settlement rise dramatically. A case in which nominal claims become
aggregated, by its very nature, lends to an air of officialdom and
legitimacy. Conversely, in a single case, a defendant has the luxury of
focusing on the peculiarities of the plaintiff or the specific facts giving
rise to the claim, often concentrating on the paltriness of the individual
claim or the plaintiff's lack of sophistication. Thus, in opposing class

47. Krank v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 109 B.R. 668, 669 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), affd, 908 F.2d
962 (3d Cir. 1990).
48. 121 B.R. 669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
49. Id. at 673 (citing Brown v. OKeefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937)). See also Sessions v.
Romadka, 145 U.S. 29 (1892) (holding abandonment prior to commencement of an action
is not required when the claim is ultimately abandoned by the trustee); Wallace v.
Lawrence Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1964); Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d
406, 409 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding the abandonment relates back so that the title stands as
if no assignment had been made).
50. 121 B.R. at 674.
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certification, defendants should focus on a myriad of other issues
tangentially related to the requisites of class certification.
A

ConsiderationsRegarding the Amount in Controversy
As a matter of strategy, it is no secret that corporate defendants prefer
to litigate class action claims in a federal forum. The federal removal
statute states that
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending. 1

Even though a case may not implicate federal law, a state class action
is nevertheless removable if it involves a dispute between citizens of
different states and the amount in controversy exceeds seventy-five
thousand dollars.52
In most state class actions, individual compensatory damage claims
rarely exceed seventy-five thousand dollars per member, exclusive of
interests and costs. Under mandate -of the United States Supreme
Court, in a diversity action, class members cannot aggregate their claims
to reach the amount in controversy requirement for removal to federal
court; each individual class member must claim in excess of the
jurisdictional amount.53 The only exception to this rule concerns
members of the class who seek to vindicate a single title or right in
Although
which they have a common and undivided interest."
compensatory damages cannot be aggregated, there is an emerging trend
for a removing defendant to satisfy the threshold jurisdictional amount
by arguing for aggregation of plaintiffs' punitive damages claims and
attorney fees.
In the Eleventh Circuit, claims for punitive damages are now allowed
to be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy. In Tapscott v. MS
Dealer Service Corp.,5" the Eleventh Circuit aggregated the claim for
punitive damages on the basis that plaintiffs had a common and

51. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1995).
52. Id. § 1332(a) & (aX1).
53. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332, 336 (1969).

54. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294 (citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39,4041 (1911)).
55. 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996); accord Turpeau v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., 936 F.
Supp. 975 (N.D. Ga. 1996), af/id mem., 112 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1997).
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undivided interest in obtaining damages from a common fund.'
Permitting aggregation, the court noted, "While the facts in this case
result in an aggregation of punitive damages, other factual situations
may dictate that punitive damages are non-aggregable. 5 7 The court in
Tapscott rejected plaintiffs' offer to amend the complaint on the grounds
that events occurring after removal, such as attempted amendments,
could not oust the federal court of jurisdiction once it attached.' A
different result is reached, however, when a plaintiff chooses to limit the
amount of damages in the initial complaint. 9 Following the rationale
of the court in Tapscott, a Georgia federal district court has set the stage
seemingly to allow any case based on diversity to be removed when the
plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages."
B. ConsiderationsRegardingMultiple Plaintiff/MultipleDefendant
Class Actions
Federal and state class action statutes unequivocally authorize class
action treatment when claims arise from the "same event" or "pattern or
practice" and are based on the "same legal theory."6 1 However,
improper joinder defenses may be asserted when not every plaintiff has
a claim against every defendant. What then happens when multiple

56. 77 F.3d at 1359.
57. Id. The court further stated: "We note without embellishing that there may be
cases where the punitive damages, albeit within a class action, would be determined on an
individualized consideration of the egregiousness of the harm done to individual class
members. In such a case, aggregation of punitive damages may very well be inappropriate."
Id. at 1359 n.13. Though the court chose not to articulate what factual situations would
prohibit aggregation of punitive damages, it noted several nonexhaustive factors used in
Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995), to assess whether claims for
punitive damages are always, by nature, common and undivided. 77 F.3d at 1359. Among
those factors are (1) how the awards are distributed; (2) whether a defendant is
disinterested in how the awards are distributed; and (3) whether the failure of one
plaintiffs claim increases the award to the others. Id. at 1359 & n.14.
58. 77 F.3d at 1359 n.15 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 293-94 (1938)).
59. In Hooks u. Associates Fin. Serus. Co., an Alabama district court recently rejected
defendant's attempts to remove a class action because in the initial pleading, plaintiff
limited the amount of damages each class member would accept or request. 966 F. Supp.
1098, 1100 (M.D. Ala. 1997). Because the individual plaintiffs self-limitation of damages
fell below the threshold jurisdictional amount of seventy-five thousand dollars the case was
remanded. Id.
60. Turpeau, 936 F. Supp. at 978.
61. Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 350. Additionally, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) permits class
action treatment when, in addition to satisfaction of the prerequisites, it is convenient and
desirable. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Winsdor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245 (1997).

50
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plaintiffs unite for economy and convenience to challenge a uniform and
systematic violation of the law by multiple but unrelated defendants?
Georgia's permissive joinder statute is virtually identical to rule 20 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 20"):
(a) PermissiveJoinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action .... A plaintiff or

defendant need not be interested in obtainingor defending againstall
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief and against one

or more of the defendants according to their respective liabilities. 2

Thus, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-20 and its federal counterpart seem to
authorize multiple plaintiff versus multiple defendant class action
lawsuits even when every plaintiff does not have a claim against every
defendant. This proposition also has support in law.
For example, in Doss v. Long,' the court held:
"In certain instances, where all members of the defendant class were
connected by a common 'juridical link,' a plaintiff class versus a
defendant class suit could be appropriate, even though no named
plaintiff would have personal claims against most members of the
defendant class. Such Juridical links' would most often be found in
instances where all members of the defendant class are officials of a
single state and are charged with enforcing or uniformly acting in
accordance with a state statute, or common rule or practice of statewide application .... ""

Similarly, in Mosley v. General Motors Corp.,'
recognized the following:

the Eighth Circuit

No hard and fast rules have been established under (Rule 20] ....
[But,] "transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend
a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.... The

62. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-20 (1993); FED. R. Cirv. P. 20 (emphasis added).
63. 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
64. Id. at 120 (quoting Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522,527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975); see also

La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1973)); Follette v.
Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing a "juridical link" is "some
independent legal relationship which relates all defendants in a way such that single
resolution of the dispute is preferred to a multiplicity of similar actions"); accord Thellins
v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1983).

65. 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974).
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analogous interpretation of the terms as used in Rule 20 would permit
all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties
to be tried in a single proceeding.'
Illustrative of this general principle is the case of In re ltel Securities
Litigation, 7 in which a court in California certified a defendant class
consisting of 113 unrelated underwriters who, pursuant to material

misrepresentations, made debenture offerings to many unrelated
plaintiffs.s Obviously, not every plaintiff had a claim against every
defendant. For economy and convenience, plaintiffs united to recover for
the wrong suffered by and common to all. The court analyzed each

component of Rule 23(a), noting that numerosity, commonality,

typicality, and adequate representation were satisfied. 9 Determining
that a defendant class could be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the
court held "questions common to the classes predominate over questions

affecting only individual class members."70 Despite the missing joinder

requirements of Rule 20, the class action proceeded. 7
For decades courts have consistently held that when a legal relationship between the defendants suggests that a single resolution of the

dispute is preferable to multiple similar actions, joinder of those
defendants is proper regardless of whether each plaintiff has a cause of
action against each defendant.7 2 This "juridical link" is defined as
"some [independent] legal relationship which relates all defendants in

66. Id. at 1333 (citations omitted).
67. 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
68. Id. at 108.
69. Id. at 111-13.
70. Id. at 114.
71. Id. at 127.
72. See Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing two exceptions to formal joinder requirements: "(1) Situations in which all
injuries are the result of a conspiracy or concerted schemes between the defendants at
whose hands the class suffered injury; and (2) Instances in which all defendants are
juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be
expeditious."). The court in Thompson did not allow a class of plaintiff teachers to join
together a class of defendant school boards because there was no state statute or uniform
policy being applied statewide by defendant school boards. Rather, each school board
adopted its own maternity leave policies to be applied to teachers within that particular
school district. As a result, plaintiff teachers as a class did not have standing to sue
defendant school boards for which they had not worked, and class certification was
inappropriate. Id. at 1205. See also Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch., 97 F.R.D.
1983) ("The requirement that each named plaintiff must have a claim
668, 675 (N.D. Ill.
against each defendant may be waived where the defendant members are related by a
conspiracy or juridical link.'" (emphasis added)); La Mar, 489 F.2d at 466 ("Nor is it
intended to apply in instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner
that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.").
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a way such that single resolution of the dispute is preferred to a
multiplicity of similar actions.""
In Moore v. Comfed Savings Bank,74 an example of the juridical link
line of cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that appellant banks were
properly joined as defendants even though none of the defendants held
any paper signed by any of the named class plaintiffs." In allowing
defendants to be joined, the court stated the following:
While all of these cases support plaintiffs' view that in the event there
is a juridical link, it is appropriate to join as a defendant a party with
whom the named class representative did not have a direct contact,
each of them presents a situation in which there was either a
contractual obligation among all defendants or a state or local statute
requiring common action by the defendants."
In authorizing the injured plaintiffs to sue a class of defendants when
each plaintiff did not have a cause of action against each defendant, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
specifically endorsed the juridical link exception in Doss v. Long:"
The last issue raised regarding the motion for class certification
involves a problem unique to bilateral plaintiff class-defendant class
litigation. It is the Rubik Cube puzzle: each plaintiff does not have a
cause of action against each defendant. In other words, Mary Doss (for
example) does not have a cause of action against Hugh Allen. Whether
this problem is analyzed in terms of standing, typicality, or commonality, it does not foil this action.7
When common questions of law and fact exist as to all plaintiffs and
all defendants, a single resolution of the dispute is preferable over
individual and repetitious suits. Otherwise, the courts waste valuable
time and resources hearing identical issues in one trial after another.
It makes judicial sense to allow the common questions of law and fact to
be resolved in a single proceeding to best achieve economies of time,
effort, expense, and fairness. This practice also promotes uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural
fairness to any of the parties.
Despite precedent that litigating duplicitous issues only once is best
achieved by liberally applying the permissive joinder statutes, one

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 676.
908 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 839.
Id at 838.
93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Id. at 119-20.
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Georgia district court has limited the applicability of the juridical link
line of cases to officials of the state who violate a single statute. In
Turpeau v. Fidelity FinancialServices, Inc.," seven plaintiffs united for
economy and convenience to sue the respective insurance company and
lender that sold and financed a policy of credit life insurance in
connection with the installment purchase of an automobile. s° Suit was
filed on the basis that even though different plaintiffs were involved,
each defendant uniformly charged and financed credit life insurance
premiums based on the total payments anticipated over the life of the
loan rather than on the "approximate" or "exact" unpaid balance on any
given day as required by O.C.G.A. section 33-31-4."l Though different

plaintiffs had claims against different defendants, the claims involved
identical questions of law and fact-whether plaintiffs were sold more
credit life insurance coverage than Georgia law allowed. 2 Despite
evidence that none of the premiums were calculated differently, the
district court reasoned that because each credit transaction was made
by different plaintiffs with different defendants, the transactions were
not sufficiently related to permit joinder under Rule 20(a).'
The
diverse defendants were removed." The district court rejected the
juridical link line of cases on the grounds that the cases only apply when
officials of the state are the defendants." The decision, however, raises
serious equal protection implications because the court recognized a
juridical link for one class (state officials) but not another (private
citizens) without a rational basis for the disparate treatment."6
C. ConsiderationsRegarding PotentialCounterclaims That Might Be
Asserted Against the Absent Class Members
Another impedance to class certification, and a defense commonly
asserted in opposition to class certification, is the possibility for potential
counterclaims against absent class members. Though the threat is often
made, serious questions exist whether counterclaims of any type may be

79. 936 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

80. Id. at 976.
81. Id. at 981 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-31-4 (1996)).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 976.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 978-79.
Id. at 980. The court's holding applied only to three of the ten defendants. The

seven remaining defendants were remanded to the State Court of Fulton County. Id, at

982.
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asserted against absent class members.8 7 "The potential assertion of
counterclaims against [a] few members of the proposed class cannot be
allowed to defeat an otherwise valid class action when to do so would
effectively deprive thousands of class members of the relief to which they
are entitled."8
Before asserting any counterclaims, a defendant must independently
demonstrate that the court has personal jurisdiction and proper venue
over the countersued individuals and must also satisfy the prerequisites
of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-23.8 9 Just as mere allegations of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation do not satisfy
plaintiffs' burden, the mere allegation that counterclaims might exist
does not defeat predominance.
Assuming the threat of counterclaim is ever acted upon, cases are still
manageable. Should a court conclude at any time that the entire group
of counterclaims makes the causes of action in the complaint unmanageable, it can deny the compulsory counterclaims that were matures°
before the case was filed and, in its discretion, can deny any permissive
counterclaims9 1 or dispose of the counterclaims for unclaimed balances
in a separate proceeding.9 2 Alternatively, a court has authority to issue
a supplemental order after certification to exclude the counterclaim
defendants from the class, or it can separate and sever the class into two
different classes--one with counterclaims and one without counterclaims.9" Thus, a bare allegation in opposition to class certification that
there might be potential counterclaims provides no rational justification
for denying class certification of the claims of thousands who may be
legitimately before the court."
D. Considerationsof Whether Georgia Law Binds Absent Class
Members to a Settlement
Georgia class action practice differs considerably from federal class
action practice under the 1966 amended version of Rule 23. Though it
has never been expressly stated, there is an argument that Georgia's
rules on class actions, unlike their federal counterparts, do not allow

87.. In PhillipsPetroleum Co. u. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985), the Supreme Court
observed that absent class members were almost never subject to counterclaims.
88. Partain v. First Natl Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
89. 1 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, § 5.30, at 5-31.
90. The mature claims are compulsory under O.C.GA. § 9-11-13(a) (1993).
91. Permissive counterclaims are covered by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(b) (1993).
92. Hi-Co Enters. v. ConAgra, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 628, 632 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
93. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1116 (5th Cir. 1978).

94. I&
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absent members to be bound by settlements about which they know
nothing. The original class actions, created in 1938, are described as "an
invention of equity... mothered by the practical necessity of providing
a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups
of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights
nor grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs." 5 Under the
original version of Rule 23, class action suits were categorized based on
the classification of the right of enforcement as follows:
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it [true class action];
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action [Hybrid
Class Action]; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the

several rights and a common relief is sought [spurious class action].W
In true and hybrid suits, under the original federal rule on class
actions, a judgment, whether favorable or unfavorable, is res judicata as
to the class.9 However, in a spurious class action, when joinder is
permissive, a judgment is binding only upon those who actually
participate in the litigation. 98 Therefore, the spurious class action is
merely "an invitation to become a fellow traveler in the litigation... not
a command performance;" the invitation to join may or may not be
accepted." Rather than requiring the spurious class members to opt out

95. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
96. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752, at
16 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added); Herring v. Ferrell, 233 Ga. 1, 4, 209 S.E.2d 599, 601
(1974) (Hall, J., dissenting).
97. 1 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, § 1.10, at 1-28.
98. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 96, § 1789, at 240-41.
99. 233 Ga. at 5, 209 S.E.2d at 602 (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973)); see also 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 23.08-23.10 (3d ed.
1997). Moore provides a good summary of class actions under the original federal Rule 23:
The "true class suit" is one wherein, but for the class action device, the joinder of
all interested persons would be essential. This would be in cases where the right
sought to be enforced was joint, common or derivative .... [In the hybrid class
suit,] the class had a mutuality of interests in the question involved, still the
rights of the members of the class were neither joint nor common; they were
several. In addition to the question of fact common to all, there was, in lieu of
joint or common interests, the presence of property which called for distribution
or management .... The spurious class suit was a permissive joinder device.
The presence of numerous persons interested in a common question of law or fact
warranted its use by persons desiring to clean up a litigious situation.... There
was no jural relationship between the members of the class; unlike, for example,
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as contemplated by the amended federal rule, the pre-1966 federal rule
required that plaintiffs opt into a spurious class action before they were
bound by a settlement or judgment.
1. Spurious Class Actions Are Different Under Amended
Federal Rule 23(b)(3). In 1966, under heavy criticism, original Rule
23 was completely and dramatically rewritten. By far, the most
controversial and dramatic innovation is that all class actions, including
the spurious type, now result in a binding judgment on all class
members regardless of whether the judgment was favorable or unfavorable."
The amended version of Rule 23(a)(3), formerly known as a spurious
class action and currently known as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action,
authorizes a class action when "the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the member of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy." 1 ' However, unlike the original version of Rule 23,
a final judgment in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action now binds all members
of a class who do not notify the court that they are opting out.'02 Prior
to the 1966 amendment, however, notice of the members' right to opt out
of a spurious class was not required because joinder was permissive
rather than compulsory."
The amended rule's notice requirement
contained in Rule 23(c)(2) attempted to strike a balance between the
guarantees of due process and the efficiencies and advantages of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action. Without a detailed and strict notice requirement,
all members of the class are bound by a judgment about which they
know nothing, and Rule 23(b)(3) judgments can act as a sword against
those uninformed members of the class. Therefore, Rule 23(b)(3) class

the members of an unincorporated association, they had taken no steps to create
a legal relationship among themselves. They were not fellow travelers by
agreement. The right or liabilities of each was distinct. The class was formed
solely by the presence of a common question of law or fact. When a suit was
brought by or against such a class, it was merely an invitation to joinder-an
invitation to become a fellow traveler in the litigation, which might or might not
be accepted. It was an invitation and not a command performance.
Id. § 23.08, 23.09, 23.10, at 23-2505, 23-2571, 23-2601.
100, 1 NEWBERG & CoMTE, supra note 7, § 1.10, at 1-26 to 1-27.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
102. Id. Members of Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(bX2) classes cannot opt out.

103. See, e.g., Howard 0. Hunter, Georgia Investment Company u. Norman-The
Supreme Court CreatesA New Form of ClassAction For Georgia, 24 MERCER L. REv. 447,
459 (1973) (and cases cited therein).

1997]

CLASS ACTION LAW

actions represent an entirely different procedure from the original Rule
23(a)(3) spurious class actions still followed by Georgia today.
2. The Controversy of Opting In Versus Opting Out. Though
most Georgia courts consistently apply the ideologies of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action to state class actions, a question exists whether "common
question" class members must opt in before they can be bound by
settlement. Georgia specifically did not adopt the amended version of
Rule 23. Instead, when enacting the Civil Practice Act of 1966 ("CPA"),
the General Assembly expressly patterned Georgia's class action rules
on the pre-1966 version of Rule 23. In this regard, and like the original
version of Rule 23(a), the General Assembly chose to categorize class
actions depending on the character of the right sought to be enforced as
follows: (1) Joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; or (2) Several, and the object
of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action.' 04
The General Assembly omitted the so-called "spurious class action" by
failing to include original Rule 23(a)(3). However, the Georgia Supreme
Court wrote this mechanism back into the CPA in Georgia Investment
Co. v. Norman."5 The same year, in Herring u. Ferrell,'36 the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "In view of the fact that a 'spurious' class suit
is merely an invitation to joinder[,] its absence in the statute is
immaterial for the reason that the specific terms of invitation are spelled
out in [O.C.G.A. section 9-11-241 on Intervention." 1"7 In this regard,
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-24(b)(2) demonstrates that, as in the original
version of Rule 23(a)(3), spurious class action members must opt in
rather than opt out to be bound by the judgment:
(b) PermissiveIntervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action:
...(2) When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common.

104. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a).
105. 229 Ga. 160, 162, 190 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1972) (authorizing class actions to be based
on common questions of law or fact). See Herring, 233 Ga. at 5-6, 209 S.E.2d at 602.
106. 233 Ga. 1, 209 S.E.2d 599 (1972).
107. Id. at 6, 209 S.E.2d at 602.
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In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.'"
By statute, intervention is permissive rather than compulsory, and
courts must exercise discretion in allowing a party to intervene. Thus,
in Georgia it is questionable whether spurious class action plaintiffs
must opt into a class action before they are bound by the final judgment
of the case.
This proposition was first raised thirteen years after Norman by the
Georgia Supreme Court in Tanner v. Brasher,1" in which the court
expressed uncertainty surrounding the nature of a common class action
created in Norman and followed in Herring:
Justice Hall, dissenting in Herring v. Ferrell,interpreted the Norman
action and a "spurious" action based upon the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A number of other cases, following Sta-PowerIndustries v. Avant, have relied upon federal precedent based upon Federal
Rule 23(b)(3) in spite of Justice Nichols' disclaimer of federal precedent
in Norman. Sta-Power itself, while expressly relying upon "(b)(3)"
cases, clouded the issue by discussing a possible requirement that class
members intervene in class suits in contravention of the opt-out
procedure provided in (b)(3) cases. Justice Nichols himself based the
Norman
action on language found in O.C.G.A. [section] 9-11-23(a)1
(1).1 0
Though most cases have treated Georgia's "spurious class action" as a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action, this question has been tacitly raised, and the
rule in Norman has remained undisturbed for twenty-four years.
Therefore, today, Georgia's class action jurisprudence begs the question:
Are absent members who did not opt into a class action bound by the
settlement? The question remains unanswered and in due time will be
ripe for resolution by the court or by the General Assembly.

III.

SE ITLEMENT ASPECTS OF CLASS ACTIONS

On a national scale, pretrial settlement of class actions fuels a
politically charged debate that class action lawsuits are an unwarranted
abuse. To urge reform, critics consistently argue that the class action
device merely enhances the pockets of lawyers; that the class members
do not benefit; that the device raises the stakes of litigation beyond the

108. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(bX2) (1993).
109. 254 Ga. 41, 326 S.E.2d 221 (1985).
110. Id. at 44 n.4, 326 S.E.2d at 221 n.4 (citations omitted).
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financial capabilities of a defendant company; and that class actions only
impose a greater burden upon the courts and parties. Though the
misconceptions are widely perceived, they are largely unfounded."'
In advancing the cry for reform, little homage is paid to the underlying
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism-to overcome the
problem that because small recoveries do not provide an incentive for
individuals to bring solo actions, the class action device allows aggregation of small claims into something worth someone's labor." 2 Admittedly, criticism is a valid process of reform; however, the effectiveness,
necessity, and utility of a class action device cannot be overlooked or
understated. Given the limited but growing number of class action
lawsuits in Georgia, there has been little effort or interest in overhauling
Georgia's statutory class action scheme." 3 As a consequence, Georgia
case precedent dealing with the "problems" associated with class action
settlements is scarce; for the most part, Georgia courts defer heavily to
federal law interpreting rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Because class actions are predominantly criticized in terms of their
settlement, and not necessarily on the merits of the litigation, the
solution lies not in abolishment or reigning of the device but rather in
greater supervision and accountability among the attorneys, courts, and
litigants who seek to vindicate the challenged class-wide practice.
Indeed, class counsel need to be mindful of the fiduciary and ethical
responsibilities that inherently remain a part of prosecuting and settling

111. Amid the lobbyist cry for class action reform, the Federal Judicial Center
undertook a study of 150 class action cases to evaluate the need to amend rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Interestingly, the study negated many widely perceived
criticisms. It found, among other things: that attorney fees in class actions generally fall
in the traditional range of one-third of the total settlement; that only nine cases of 150
certified classes resulted in individual recoveries of less than one hundred dollars; that
settlements are not coerced by the prospects of class certification; that the median recovery
ranged from three hundred to five hundred dollars; and that "strike suits" or unmeritorious
actions are generally junked early by summary judgment or dismissal motions. See
generally T. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOuR FEDERAL
D'imc'T CouRTs: FNAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996).
112. Amchem Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
113. Nevertheless, interest groups have on occasion lobbied the General Assembly to
insert anti-class action provisions into various Georgia laws, thereby protecting business
interests from the widespread reach of Georgia Rule 23. Anti-class action legislation is
included in the Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a) (1994 & Supp.
1997); the Georgia Industrial Loan Act, O.C.G.A. § 7-3-29(e) (1997); various provisions of
the usury statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-5(b), 7-4-21 (1997); the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-36.1(a) (1994); a law prohibiting discriminatory lending practices, O.C.G.A.
§ 7-6-2 (1997); and the Below Cost Sales Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-255(c) (1994).
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a class action lawsuit, including the responsibility to advocate for those
of modest means."
Determination of Attorney Fees to Class Counsel
Designed partly as a guardian mechanism against class action
settlement abuses, Rule 23(e) requires the court's supervision and
approval of any class action settlement.11 Georgia's counterpart is
similar.1 " As primary ammunition in opposition to the class action
device, critics point generally to large awards of attorney fees as a
motivating factor for the attorney to bring class actions. 1 7 Whether
true or not, the fees paid are not unilaterally declared by the plaintiffs'
lawyers. The determination of fees is a joint effort agreed by the parties
and ultimately approved by the court.1 8 Normally, attorney fees are
not an issue until the preliminary or final settlement hearing that
usually occurs after years of litigation.1 Ultimately, the trial court,
not the plaintiffs' lawyers, determines whether the petitioned attorney
fees are reasonable. is°
Like many jurisdictions, Georgia follows the "American Rule" in regard
to the payment of attorney fees, calling for each party to bear its own

A.

114. Georgia lawyers are under an ethical responsibility to make legal services
available. EC 2-1 of the Georgia Rules on Ethics states, in relevant part:
The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize
their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able
to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of
the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize their legal problems, to
facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making
legal services fully available.
GA. ST. BAR R. 3-102, EC 2-1 (1997).
115. FED R. Cv. P. 23(e) provides the following: "A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
116. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(c) provides the following:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court. If the right sought to be enforced is (joint, common, or secondary], notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs. If the right is [several and affects specific
property), notice shall be given only if the court requires it.
117. ARTHUR R. MILLER, ATrORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS AcTioNs ch. 11 (Federal Judicial

Center 1980).
118. Camden I Condominium Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991).
119. 2 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, § 11.29, at 11-61 to 11-62.
120. Camden 1, 946 F.2d at 771 (citing Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S.
116, 127-28 (1985)). This is often ignored by the critics.

1997]

CLASS ACTION LAW

expenses of litigation. 2 '

In the context of class actions, however,

advancement of the American Rule is sharply criticized by those who

believe it does not provide a complete legal remedy to a successful class
action litigant because it does not allow for reimbursement of the high
litigation costs of numerous, although nominal, claims." Furthermore, it is charged that the American Rule discourages meritorious class
action litigation by the lower and middle class because only the affluent
can afford to pay for and maintain a class action lawsuit against a
wealthy corporate defendant."im
Recognizing these criticisms as well as the public policy pronouncement to afford fairness and access to litigants of all stature, our courts
and legislative bodies have created judicial and legislative exceptions to
the American Rule in the context of class action litigation. The judicial

exception, known as the "common fund" exception, is based on principles
of equity and fairness. It is an acknowledgement that the American
Rule does not provide a complete legal remedy to justify one's time and
effort in representing the numerous but relatively small claims often
On the other hand, the legislative
asserted in a class action."2

121. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11(1982 & Supp. 1997); See also Camden I, 946 F.2d at 771; Blue
v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1978); Georgia v. Private Truck Council,
Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 534, 371 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1988); John S. Hoak, Attorneys Fees:
Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1976); cf Industrial Distribution
Group, Inc. v. Waite, 268 Ga. 115,485 S.E.2d 792 (1997) (non-class action case delineating
the general exception to the American Rule).
122. See generally James H. Cheek, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the UltimateBurden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees
and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee:
Why Not a Cost of Litigation?49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963). It is axiomatic under Georgia law
that "[eiquity will not take cognizance of a plain legal right where an adequate and
complete remedy is provided by law." O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4 (1982). Arguably, the converse
of this equitable proposition may hold true: If a court of law does not provide a "complete"
remedy, a successful litigant who seeks an award of attorney fees may petition a court of
equity for redress.
123. Cheek, supranote 122; Kuenzel, supra note 122; Robert T. Mowery, Attorney Fees
in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267 (1978).
124. For purposes of practice and pleading in the early days of class action lawsuits,
the theory of unjust enrichment laid the basis for fee awards. In Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527 (1881), the United States Supreme Court held the following:
[W]here one of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund, at his own
expense takes proper proceedings to save it from destruction and to restore it to
the purposes of the trust, he is entitled to reimbursement, either out of the fund
itself, or by proportional contribution from those who accept the benefit of his
efforts. This has long been the rule in relation to proceedings for restoring
property to the uses of a charity, which has been unjustly diverted therefrom.
Id. at 532-33. This principle was expanded in CentralR.R. & Banking Co., 113 U.S. 116,
in which the Supreme Court allowed fees to be directly awarded to attorneys based upon
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exception is based upon "fee shifting"126
statutes 125 that take into account
case.
the
of
complexity
the effort and
Exceptions to the American Rule are applied differently when the trial
courts seek to determine the reasonableness of fee award proposals.
This different treatment was apparent in Blum v. Stenson, 2 7 a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit regarding the unlawful termination
of Medicaid benefits." s In Blum, attorney fees were petitioned
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("Section 1988"), a fee shifting statute. In
cogent terms, the United States Supreme Court espoused its belief that
the number of persons benefiting from the class action litigation was not
a significant consideration in calculating fees under a fee shifting
statute. 129 Instead, the Court concluded:
Unlike the calculation of attorney's fees under the "common fund
doctrine," where a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund
bestowed on the class, a reasonable fee under [Section] 1988 reflects
the amount of attorney time reasonably expended on the litigation.
Presumably, counsel will spend as much time and will be as diligent in

their labors expended in securing the common fund. Id, at 127.
125. A "fee shifting" statute allows for an award of attorney fees under selected statutes
granting or protecting various rights. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court noted the following federal fee shifting
statutes: Amendments to Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a); Packers and
Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 499g(b); Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(1), 641-644; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15;
Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e); Trust
Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78r(a); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a)(2) (1970 & Supp. II); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (copyrights);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1970 & Supp. II); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e); Fair Labor
Standards Act, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1970 & Supp. II); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1970 & Supp. II); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1970 & Supp. II); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (patent infringement);
Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d)
(1970 & Supp. II); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p); The Merchant Marine Act of
1936,46 U.S.C. § 1227; Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 206; Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 16(2), 308(b), 908(b); and FED. R. Cwr. P. 37(a), (c). Alyeska Pipeline,
421 U.S. at 260, n.33.
126. Though highly critical of large fee awards, few critics can argue that a class action
is not difficult and complex work.
127. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
128. Id. at 889.
129. Id at 900 n.16.
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litigating a case that benefits a small class of people, or, indeed, in
protecting the civil rights of a single individual.'3

Accordingly, the Court awarded a lesser amount of attorney fees than
was petitioned."3 ' The Court also noted that one of the predominating
factors in determining a fee award under fee shifting statutes such as
Section 1988 is the reasonable amount of time expended by counsel
multiplied by the prevailing market rates in the community in which the
action was brought.'3 2
Therefore, in arguing for or against a certain fee award, party litigants
must be cognizant of the basis on which class counsel seeks an award of
attorney fees. Is the petition for the fee award based upon a common
fund or is it based upon a fee shifting statute? The analysis that the
court may employ to determine reasonableness is significantly impacted
by whether the prayer for attorney fees is justified by a common fund,
or a fee shifting statute.
B. Fees Awarded from a Common Fund
From an historical perspective, common fund fee awards are justified
on the basis that those "who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without
contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's
expense."" A common fund is created from the proceeds of the total
settlement to ensure that the expenses of litigation, including attorney
fees, are apportioned equitably among all those who benefit from the
action. To determine what constitutes the common fund award, it is well
settled that courts look to the total potential benefit bestowed upon the
class as a whole, not merely the number and amount of claims filed
during settlement administration.'" It is not unusual for courts to
apply the "common benefit doctrine" to place a value on nonpecuniary

130. Id.
131. Id. at 902.
132. Id. at 897 ("When, however, the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of
showing that the claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product
is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by [Section] 1988."). Obviously, such
a view does little to clarify the law and promote uniformity of decision and across-the-board
guidance in cases when the "prevailing market rates" are not easily determinable. Thus,
the Supreme Court has tacitly deferred to each circuit's notion of reasonableness and
fairness in regard to awards made pursuant to fee shifting statutes. The consequences are
obvious.
133. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
134. Id. at 480-81; 2 NEWBERG & ComTm, supra note 7, § 11.29.
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benefits to determine the total value of the common fund.3 5 To justify
larger common fund fee awards, the doctrine provides a natural
incentive for class counsel to maximize both monetary and nonmonetary
benefits to the class."M
As the concept of the common fund fee award has unfolded, a split
within the federal courts as to the reasonableness of a fee award is
emerging. The longstanding methodology, the "percentage of the
common fund"'37 approach, is dichotomous to the "lodestar" approach. 8' When employing the percentage of the common fund
approach, some courts determine attorney fees by calculating the
potential value of the common fund multiplied by a percentage
determined on an ad hoc basis.3 9 In regard to the lodestar approach,
however, courts determine reasonableness of the award as a factor of the
time and effort spent on the case multiplied by an hourly rate deemed
The fixed
reasonable for similarly complex noncontingent work.'
amount is then adjusted up or down by certain multipliers such as the
risk of contingency or the quality of the work performed.' 4 ' Again,
though it may be practical, the methodology does little to promote
uniformity and guidance on how to best conclude a class action once the
parties agree to settle the dispute.

135. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
on remand, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977); Camden 1, 946 F.2d 768. Prior to the United
States Supreme Court pronouncements in Blum, 465 U.S. 886, diverse situations in which

nonpecuniary benefits had been evaluated included prisoners' rights litigation. See Mills,
396 U.S. 375 (stockholders actions for violations of securities laws); Brewer v. School Bd.
(school desegregation actions), 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F.
Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified, 522 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded
for consideration in light of Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. 240, and Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
136. For example, in a case against an abusive or predatory lender, a nonmonetary
benefit (often overlooked by critics) may contemplate the forgiveness of existing
deficiencies. Under this scenario, individual monetary recovery may be nominal, but the
overall nonmonetary benefits are significant.

137. The court in Camden 1, 946 F.2d at 771, stated the following:
From the time of the Pettus [113 U.S. 116] decision in 1885 until 1973, fee awards
granted pursuant to the common fund exception were computed as a percentage
of the fund. The amount of the fee was left to the district court's discretion, with
the only standard being reasonableness under the circumstances of a particular
case.
See also COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES, REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRcUIT TASK FORCE, 108
F.R.D. 237, 242 (1985) (Arthur R. Miller, reporter) [hereinafter THE TASK FORCE REPORT].
138. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).
139. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 771.
140. Id. at 772.
141. Id.
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In Camden I Condominium Ass'n v. Dunkle,"4 the Eleventh Circuit
clarified that it will follow the percentage of the fund methodology. The
court explained that because monetary results in a common fund class
action case predominate over all other criteria, the desired goals are
better achieved:
[to] provide fair and reasonable compensation to attorneys ... to

discourage abuses and delays in the fee-setting process; to encourage
early settlement or determination of cases; to provide predictability; to

carry out the purposes underlying court-awarded compensation; to
simplify the process by reducing the burdens it currently imposes on
the courts and on litigants; and to arrive at fee awards that are fair
and equitable to the parties and that take into account the economic
realities of the practice of law."
These factors, along with a dearth of authority from the United States
Supreme Court, led Judge Dubina to conclude that the methodology
which applied the percentage of the common fund was the most
reasonable approach. 1"
In determining the percentage in this approach, the court indicated
that most common fund fee award cases fall in the range of twenty
percent to thirty percent of the fund with twenty-five percent constituting a benchmark. 4 5 As a matter of judicial review, the factors announced in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,' are used to
adjust percentage fee awards on a case by case basis. 4 ' These factors,
it was noted, should be analyzed by the trial court when selecting the
percentage amount used to determine the award of attorney fees.'"
The standards articulated in Camden I appear to be more relaxed with
respect to common fund attorney fee awards in Georgia courts. In
Georgia v. Private Truck Counsel,'49 the Georgia Supreme Court, in a

142. 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 773 (citing THE TASK FORCE REPORT, 108 F.R.D. at 238).
144. Id. at 774.
145. Id. at 774-75.
146. 488 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)
the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed
by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys (10) the "undesirability" of the case,
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards
in similar cases. Id. at 717-19.
148. 946 F.2d at 775.

149. 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988).
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decision issued prior to Camden I upheld the notion that attorney fees
may be awarded from a common fund class action lawsuit."W In so
holding, the court endorsed the percentage of the common fund approach
to determine reasonable attorney fees by agreeing that the fees were not
properly awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,151 which necessarily
employs the lodestar approach.'
Thus, like federal law in the
Eleventh Circuit, Georgia precedent indicates a preference for the
percentage of the common fund approach to determine the reasonableness of an attorney fee award.
C.

Fee Award Based upon Fee Shifting Statutes
In the Eleventh Circuit, a fee shifting statute that entitles the
prevailing party to attorney fees typically employs the lodestar
methodology to determine reasonableness. " This necessarily contemplates that the fees could be awarded not only to a prevailing plaintiff
but also, in the court's discretion, to a prevailing defendant.'" Georgia
courts remain silent on these specific issues.'
D.

Ethical ConsiderationsRegarding Settlement Negotiations
Besides the obvious concerns governing monetary and nonmonetary
benefits to class members, lawyers should be cognizant of an issue that
arises in the context of negotiating fees under a fee shifting statute
simultaneously with negotiating a class award. Due to potential public
misunderstandings that may be cultivated in regard to the interests of
the class, legitimate concern has been raised over the propriety of
negotiating attorney fees before or in connection with the award for the
class. " ' Therefore, it is good practice, at least in the realm of a fee
shifting statute, to resolve the issue of attorney fees after the propriety,
merits, and damages of the class claims are resolved to satisfaction.

150. Id. at 534, 371 S.E.2d at 381.

151. Id. at 535, 371 S.E.2d at 381.
152. See generally Blum, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
153. Camden I, 946 F.2d 768; see also Blum, 465 U.S. 886.
154. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S' 412, 412 (1978). The Court
specified that a fee award to the defendant was proper if the plaintiffs action was
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id.
155. In the absence of any controlling law, great weight is placed upon federal
decisions. Accordingly, a plausible argument is that a fee shifting statute pled in a Georgia
court deserves the same treatment as one in a federal court.
156.

Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977).
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E.

Cy Pres Funds
Cy pres, which stands for "next best use," is a method for class
counsel, subject to court approval, to provide indirect benefits to the
class by distributing the funds generatedas a result of the litigation for
their next best use.'57 Cy pres distributions arise when money is not
distributed to or claimed by class members and is thereafter pledged to
legal, governmental, charitable, or religious groups to further the
interests of the class or for other important social concerns. Several
examples, including one recent Georgia cy pres distribution,'" show
that courts are willing to approve many different sorts of payments.
Among these are a payment to state agencies for use in public health
programs, 9 a payment to area law schools or medical schools for
general use, a payment to a newly formed foundation to study the
biological effects of radiation exposure, escheatment to the State of
Pennsylvania, and a payment to a nonprofit boys' ranch."® Although
the possibility remains that class action counsel could abuse this process
by moving the court to fund pet projects, it is ultimately up to the court
with jurisdiction over the cy pres funds to approve, in equity and good
conscience, the next best use of unclaimed funds."'
During the processes of negotiating a class action settlement, the
subject of cy pres is often discussed. Experience dictates that stronger
cases of liability and damages typically result in concessions made by

157. See generally 2 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, § 11.20 at 11-26. 'The cy pres,
or next best use, doctrine originated in the charitable trust field when courts took steps to
prevent the failure of trusts." Id. (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND

TRUSTEES §§ 431-450 (2d ed. 1964)).
158. See Starrv. Fleet FinanceInc., No. 92-2314-06 (Cobb County Super. Ct., Mar. 27,
1996), a case involving predatory lending practices targeted upon low income homeowners.
The superior court approved nearly $400,000 in cy pres funds to be distributed among
groups such as the Atlanta Legal Aid Society's Home Defense Program (a program within
the Legal Aid Society that lends legal assistance to low income homeowners victimized by
predatory lenders), the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (a nonprofit
corporation designed to help low income homeowners), the Consumer Law Center of the
South (an entity whose mission is to promote reform in consumer rights through
legislation), and the Congregation Shearith Israel Night Shelter (a bed shelter for homeless
women). See H. Rothbloom, Cy Pres: Do the Right Thing, 2 THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE 26
(1996).
159. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
160. See 2 NEWBERG & COMTE, supra note 7, at § 11.20, at 11-27; In re Three Mile
Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Vecchione v. Wolgemuth, No. 73-162 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); Evans v. McMorris Downtown Ford, Inc., No. 272,850 (Tex. 1980).
161. See, e.g., Boeing, 444 U.S. at 488 n.4.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

one or more defendants that cy pres funding to certain groups or projects
be part of the settlement makeup. Likewise, weaker cases of liability or
damages typically result in a reversion of any unclaimed or undistributed funds to the defendant. 2 If the settlement agreement is silent
with respect to cy pres funding, the substantive policies underlying the
laws sued upon are better served by distributing the cy pres funds to
groups or projects rather than allowing the money to revert to the
defendants."
As a final consideration, due regard to the court's jurisdictional powers
must be considered. Because the underpinnings of cy pres funding
originate from the court's equitable powers, it is important to realize
from the outset of filing a suit that only courts of equity, such as a
Georgia superior court' or a federal district court,' can order a
distribution of cy pres funds. Consequently, class counsel is advised to
take this into consideration when filing suit. Failing to realize this could
result in class counsel giving up a powerful tool in the settlement
process as well as an important social benefit in recognition of a
widespread wrong.
F

PracticalSettlement Considerations
It is not unusual for the settlement of class action lawsuits to take
months or even years. Once the parties have agreed to the parameters
of a settlement, two hearings are customary-a preliminary settlement
hearing and a final settlement hearing.' The preliminary settlement
hearing allows the parties to present the settlement for explanation to
the trial court. Occasionally, if there is a dispute between the parties
concerning any aspect of the settlement, it is appropriate at this hearing

162. Id. In this situation, class counsel need to be on guard to prevent the perceived
abuse that class members received virtually no nonmonetary benefit because the unclaimed
funds reverted to the defendant. If nonmonetary benefits are assigned in a percentage of
the common fund case, reversion has no bearing upon the fee award, and it outwardly
appears as though the class counsel has not attempted to adequately protect the interests
of the class.
163. 2 NEWBERG & CoMTE, supra note 7, § 11.20, at 11-29.
164. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, para. 1 (superior courts have exclusive equity jurisdiction).
165. See Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. 425 (1868). "The equity jurisdiction conferred on the
Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses; is
subject to neither limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout
the different States of the Union." Id. at 430.
166. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e) on settlement of class actions reads in its entirety: "A class
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." There is no corresponding Georgia state law provision.
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for the court to step in and resolve the disagreements. Likewise, any
concerns the court may have regarding the settlement are addressed.
Assuming that the court agrees with the settlement accord reached
between the parties, an order approving the agreement is usually signed,
and the mechanics of setting forth the notice requirements of a final
settlement hearing begins.
In recent years substantial controversy in federal venues has
surrounded the propriety of a court's approving a "settlement class
action," which is a class action certified for settlement purposes only,
versus a "litigation class action," which concerns a class action that has
been certified by the court prior to submission for settlement.167
Although the difference seems subtle, a settlement class action allows
the plaintiff, by virtue of the parties' agreement, to bypass the requirements of proving numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation and to submit the case and the proposed class for
settlement. A litigation class action, on the other hand, generates no
controversy towards settlement because the court has previously ruled
on certification issues.
Critics of settlement class actions have charged that when courts fail
to consider certification issues, court surveillance regarding the ultimate
fairness of a class action could be compromised to the point that the
parties could actually deceive the court in a "staged performance" in
their request for approval of a settlement class.'
Proponents, on the
other hand, argue that using the settlement class to resolve sprawling
claims such as those presented in the asbestos litigation or in the breast
implant cases is judicially efficient, economical, and very effective." 9
The United States Supreme Court has now resolved this dispute. In
70
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,"
the Court held that although
settlement of a case is "relevant" in determining whether a settlement
class should be approved, the factors underlying class certification

167.

See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,

55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); cf In re Asbestos Litig., 90
F.3d 963, 975-76 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom, Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp, 117 S. Ct.
2503 (1997), and Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
168. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352(7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (parties "may even put one

over on the court, in a staged performance"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). See also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1343, 1379-80 (1995) (class counsel confined to a settlement negotiation does not
have the threat of litigation to press for a bettor offer).
169. Indeed, settlement classes have become a commonplace happening. See T.
WIL 'NG, supra note 111, at 61-62.
170. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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cannot be ignored and must be addressed by the court when considering
fairness.171 Consequently, parties in a federal forum must address
certification factors when submitting a settlement class for approval to
the court. It remains to be seen whether Georgia courts will follow suit.
Upon approval of a settlement at the preliminary hearing, it is
customary for notice to be published to the class members to inform
them of the settlement. This is typically done through the mail, the
print media, web pages or other electronic media, or any combination.
The notice is designed to adequately inform the class members of the
settlement. The class members typically will have an opportunity to
object to the settlement or decide whether to opt in or opt out depending
on the type of action being litigated. A class member who decides not to
participate in the class action may file a separate suit and seek
individual damages.
IV CONCLUSION
From a layman's point of view, it is easy to perceive that a class action
overcompensates lawyers and undercompensates class members.
Nevertheless, no one has proposed a better scheme to tackle the
problems associated with litigation involving multiple persons and
relatively small claims. No one can dispute that class action lawsuits,
when properly used, effectively serve as a watchdog for breaches of
business practices towards a company's unsuspecting customers. At
little or no cost to consumers or taxpayers, the system encourages the
civil prosecution of contract violations, actions concerning written fraud,
civil RICO actions, truth-in-lending violations, skimming operations, and
other consumer protection laws. Further, the legacy of product liability
class action lawsuits has been to remove harmful products from the
stream of commerce and to improve upon the designs for safer substitutes. In essence, this litigation gives citizens the opportunity to put
into check certain conduct not otherwise tolerated under our system of
jurisprudence.

171. Id. at 2248.

